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En the past 15 years, the banking industry
has faced growing competition from other
lii financial service firms and financial mar-
kers and, at the same time, has undergone
subsnannial deregulation and change.
Proponents offurther deregulation, such as
the removal of barriers no nhe commingling
of commercial and investment banking,
argue that such changes would enhance the
eff’mciency and viabilityof American banks.
The impact of competitive and regulatory
changes on banks can be judged by gross
measures of performance, such as profitability
and failure rates. Economisns are also inter-
ested in how such changes affect the efficiency
with which banks transform resources into
various financial services. Inefficiency implies
that resources are wasned, that is, that firms
are producing less than the feasible level
ofoutput from the resources employed,
or are usingrelatively costly combinations
ofresources no produce a particular mix
ofproducts or services, Thus, a goal of
policymakers, as well as stockholders and
managers, is to devise policies than improve
the efficiency ofcommercial banks.
linforrunately, economists do not agree
upon the appropriate methodology for mea-
suring the efficiency of banks, Several
estimation techniques have been proposed,
eachwith advantages and disadvantages.
The problem is complicated by the myriad
ofdifferent services that commercial banks
perform. Researchers deal winh complex
issues in measuring bank production: Is a
deposit an input no the production process,
or an output? Should outputs he measured
in terms ofthe number of a bank’s accounts,
the number of transactions it processes or
the dollar amounts of Its loans or deposits?
Perhaps non surprisingly estimates of com-
mercial bank inefficiency vary considerably
across studies that use different techniques,
conceptions of bank production and data
samples.
This article investigates the sensitivity
ofefficiency measures no broadly different
conceptions of how banks operate. We use
a single-esnimanion technique and a common
pooi of banks to compare efficiency measures
based on alnernanive views ofbankproduction.
We find substantial differences in mean
efficiency across models and low, though
statistically significant, correspondence in
the rankings of banks by efficiency scores
across models.
First, we discuss why measuring
commercial bank efficiency is useful,
some alternative measures of efficiency
and techniques for estimating efficiency
A description ofthe approach we take,
our data and our results follow.
WHY DO WE CARE ABOUT
THE EFFICIENCY OF
COMMERCIAL BANKS?
The performance of firms is often
described in terms of their efficiency The
measured efficiency of a production unit
(a firm or plant) is generically interpreted
as the difference between ins observed inpun
and output levels and the corresponding
optimal values. An output-oriented measure
of efficiency compares observed output with
the maximum output possible for given input
levels. Alternatively an input-oriented
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efficiency measure compares the observed
level of inputs with the minimum input that
could produce the observed level of output.
These are measures oftechnical efficiency
and as such ignore the behavioral goals
of the firm.
Measures ofallocanive efficiency com-
pare the observed mix of inputs or outputs
with the optimal mix that would minimize
cost, maximize profit or obtain any other
behavioral goal. Allocative efficiency can
be combined with technical efficiency no
measure overall efficiency. In addition,
measures of technical efficiency canbe used
to construct measures of scale efficiency
which involve comparison of observed and
optimal scale, or size, ofthe firm. One can
also measure scope efficiency which involves
comparison ofthe cost ofproducing nhe
observed mix of outputs in a single firm
with the costs that would prevail if each
output was produced in a separate firm.
Researchers have found that banks suffer
more from technical inefficiency than from
scale or scope inefficiency (for example,
Berger and Humphrey, 1991).
The efficiency of commercialbanks is
important for at least two reasons, First,
efficiency measures are indicators of success,
by which the performance ofindividual banks,
and the industry as a whole, can he gauged.
Banks face growing competition, both from
other banks and from firms and markets out-
side the industry (see Wheelock, 1993), and
presumablybanks will he more successful in
maintaining their business if they operate
efficiently Berger and Humphrey (1992)
find that during the 1980s high-cost banks
experienced higher rates of failure than more
efficient banks. Similarly in a study ofbank
failures during the 1920s, Wheelock and
Wilson (1995) find that the less technically
efficient a bank was, the greaterits likeli-
hood offailure.
A second reason no investigate the effi-
ciency ofcommercial banks is the potential
impact ofgovernmentpolicies on efficiency
One might gauge the impact of a regulatory
change by measuring its effect on commer-
cial bank efficiency or examine efficiency
among banks in different states no measure
the effect of differences in branching restric-
tions or other regulations. Recent proposals
to end nhe Glass-Steagall separation of com-
mercial and investmentbanking stem in
part from a view than broader powers could
enhance the efficiency of banks and other
financial institutions. Obviously this change
could enhance the scope efficiency of banks
if there are complementarities in nhe produc-
tion ofcoonmercial and invesnment banking
services. Conceivably such change could
also improve scale or overall efficiency
Improved efficiency is also one argument
made in support of interstate branching and,
indeed, Grabowski, Rangan and Rezvanian
(1993) find that branch banking organiza-
tions are more efficient than multiple-office
bank holding companies.
Other studies have considered whether
bank mergers enhance efficiency Using dif-
ferent approaches, Rhodes (1993) finds that
mergers have not generally improved effi-
ciency though Fixler and Zieschang (1993)
conclude the opposite. Shaffer (1993), on
the ocher hand, evaluates potential mergers
and concludes that they could significantly
reduce inefficiency for many banks of less
than $10 billion ofassets.
The impact ofownership or manage-
ment structure on efficiency has also been
studied. Pi and Timme (1993), for example,
find than banks whose chief executive officer
also serves as hoard chairman are less effi-
cient than other banks, and Mester (1993)
shows that mutual savings and loan associa-
tions are more efficient than stock S&Ls,
ME’ASUR.INO COMMER,CI,AL
BANK EFI-ICIENCY
The efficiency of commercial banks has
been studied using a variety of techniques
and samples, and, as noted above, has been
used to address numerous policy issues.
Recent studies typically use techniques than
accommodate the multiple outputs of banks
and measure the efficiency ofindividual banks
relative to a standard set by peer institutions.
Readers interested in a surveyof this research
can refer to Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993).
To date, no technique for measuring
efficiencyhas been generally accepted and
different methodologies appear to generate
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considerable differences in measured effi-
ciency even when common bank samples
are used, Variants offour techniques are
common in the literature. The “stochastic
cost frontier” approach is an economenric
methodology in which deviations of a firm’s
actual cost from predicted cost are presumed
no be due no random error and inefficiency
each of which is assumed no have a particular
statistical distribution (usually the normal
distribution for the random error and a half-
normal forinefficiency). The “thick frontier”
approach is a variant in which deviations
from predicted cost within the lowest average
cost quartile of banks are assumed due no
random error, and the differences between
the predicted costs of banks in the highest
and Lowest quartiles are assumed to he due
no inefficiency The ‘distribution-free”
approach is applicable when data for more
than one year are available. It assumes that
inefficiency is stable over time, while random
errors average out over time. ‘rhat is, a bank’s
inefficiency for a span ofyears is taken to he
the mean of ins measured inefficiency across
all years within the period. Finally “Dana
Fnvebopment Analysis” (DEA) is a non-para-
metric methodology in which linear pro-
gramming is used no measure the distance
of individual banks from the efficient, or
“best-practice,” frontier, All deviations
from the efficient frontier are assumed
to be due to inefficiency
Researchers have found that esnianates
of inefficiency are sensitive to the choice of
technique. Ferrier and L.ovell (1990), for
example, apply the snochasnic cost frontier
and DEA techniques no a common sample
of banks and arrive at different esnimates of
inefficiency Berger (1993) finds substantial
differences in measured efficiency from two
variants of the distribution-free approach.
A second reason why different studies
of commercial hank efficiency often reach
seemingly contradictory findings might
stem from differences in how a banking
firm is modeled, Regardless ofwhich of
the four measurement techniques is used,
the researcher must specify a list of inputs
and outputs. The question, “What do banks
produce?” is non simple to answer, Banks
provide a variety ofservices, from loans
and deposit accounts to trust services, safe
deposit box rentals, mutual fund sales and
foreign exchange transactions. Moreover,
changes in regulation, technology and cus-
tomer demands have caused the types of
services that banks perform no change over
time, For example, banks now provide a
variety of securities-related services, such
as underwriting and mutual fund sales,
which regulators fi)rbid a few years ago. To
tractably measure efficiency researchers are
forced to begin winh simplified models of
the banking firm, Unreliable estimates of
efficiency can stem from the use ofmodels
than omit key features of hank production.
Some researchers view banks as prodntcers
ofloans and deposit accounts, and measure
output by either the nutnher of transactions
or accounts serviced, This view is referred to
as the “production” approach. Others argue
that a bank’s output should be measured in
terms of thedollar volume of loans or deposits
it provides, a view known as the “innermedi-
ation” approach. Most studies ofinefficiency
use the intermediation approach, in part
because the necessary data are more readily
obtained. We are aware of only one recent
study taking the production approach (Ferrier
and Lovell. 1990), though in the 1970s and
early 1980s such studies were more common
(see Gilbert, 1984). The production approach
focuses on operating costs and ignores interest
expense. The intermediation approach, on
the other hand, includes both operating and
interest expenses, and hence may be of more
interest for studying the viability of banks
(see Berger, Hanweck and Humphrey, 1987;
or Ferrier and Lovell, 1990). For analysis of
the operating efficiency of banks.., however,
the production approach may be of interest.
Among those who use the intermedia-
tion approach are researchers who hold the
view that banks produce various loans and
other investments from deposits, other fund-
ing sources, labor and materials, This “asset”
approach has been criticized because in
ignores the fact that banks expend consider-
able resources supplying transactions and
savings deposits (Berger and Humphrey 1992).
Some researchers apply empirical criteria
to determine what services to consider as bank
outputs and what to consider as inputs.
FEDERAL RESERVE SANK OF ST. LOUIS
41DF~iIr~
JULY/AUGUST 1995
Berger and Humphrey (1992), for exaanple.
classify activities for which banks create high
added value, such as loans, demanddeposits
and time and savings deposits as important
outputs, with labor, physical capital and pur-
chased funds classified as inputs. Alternatively
Aly Grahowski. Pasurka and Rangan (1990),
I’lancock (1991) and Fixler and Zieschang
(1993) adopt a “user-cost” framework, whereby
a hankasset is classified as an output if the
financial return on the asset exceeds the
opportunity cost of the investment, and a lia-
bility is classified as an output if the financial
cost ofthe liability is less than ins opportunity
cost. Even though their details differ, the two
approaches empirically tend to suggest simi-
lar classifications of inputs and outputs. The
main exception is classification of demand
deposits as an output in most user-cost stud-
ies, and as both an input and an output when
the value-added approach is used (see Berger
and Humphrey 1992, for more detail).
Table I summarizes six recent studies of
commercial bank production efficiency
Although representative, this list is far from
exhaustive, These studies employ a variety
ofestimation techniques and include a variety
ofdifferent inputs and outputs in modeling
the banking firm, The studies typically report
inefficiency measures by hank-size grouping
and for more than one type of inefficiency
though for brevity we report just the mean
overall inefficiency The reported percent-
ages indicate the extent no \vhich the average
hank overused inputs to produce a given
level ofoutput. Thus, the 35 percent ineffi-
ciency found by Aly and others (1990) indi-
cates that the average hank could have pro-
duced the same level of output with just
65 percent of the input levels actually used.
Measured inefficiency clearly varies with
estimation technique, model specification
and, probably the sample of banks used by
the researcher.
In the retnainder of this article, we
investigate the extent to which measures
of efficiency and the rankings ofindividual
banks depend on whether the intermediation
approach or production approach is employed.
Because we are interested in the impact of
the approach taken on measured efficiency
we use a single technique—DEA-----applied
to a common pool of banks. Our findings
might, ofcourse, be different ifwe used another
technique or sample, bun the purpose of this
article is to investigate how sensitive efficiency
measures are to the modelof bank production
employed.
MZW?OOLCOY
We trace our measures of efficiency to
the work ofDehreu (1951) and Farrell (1957).
Boles (1966) was one ofthe first no use Linear
programming methods no measure eflicicncy
in production using their ideas. Other exten-
sions have collectively come to he named
Data Fnvelopment Analysis (DEA), a term
coined by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978).
LovelI (1993) summarizes this Iineaanure.
Details about the efficiency oneasures
used in this article are contained in the shad-
ed insert on page 6. The essential ideas,
however, are illustrated in Figure 1, which
considers the case of a sample of firms pro-
ducing a single output from two inputs, x1
and x,. Suppose firms A, B and C each pro-
duce a given Level of output; A and B lie on
the production frotonier XX’, while C lies in
the interior of the production set. The fron-
tier XX’ is the sen ofall conahinations of
input.s which can produce the same level of
output, and where the reduction of at least
one input necessarily causes output to fall.
Hence, firms A and B are regarded as effi-
cient, whereas firm C is regarded as ineffi-
cient. Inefficient firms such as C may lie in
the interiorof the production set due to
imperfect information, managerial incompe-
tence or perhaps other reasons, For firm C,
inpun weak technical efficiency (IWE) is
defined as the ratio of distances OC’IOC in
Figure 1. By reducing the input quantities
used by firm Chy this amount, the firm
could move to point C’ and would be consid-
ered efficient in the IWF sense.
Next, we define input overall efficiency
(bE). In terms of Figure 1, the isocosn line
is given by PP’. For firm C, the LOE score is
given by the ratio of distances OC”IOC,
Although the point C” lies outside the pro-
duction set boundary andL hence is not feasi-
ble, input costs an C” are the same as an B,
which is a feasible point. Hence, if firm C
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Selected Studies of Commercial Bank Production Inefficiency
Study, Technique, Approach Inputs Outputs Sample Results
Aly andatlters(1990k labor, physical copitol, real estate loans, corn- rondom, 322 overall
DEk loanablefunds mercial loans, consumer banks, 1986 data inefficiency 35%
intermediation loans, allother loons
demand deposits
hrger andtltmiphrey labor physical copttol, demand deposits, all banks, 1984 total tnefficiency
(1991), purchased funds etaillime and savings data 24% (branchtng
finch frontier; deposits, real estate states) 19% (unit
intermediation loans, commercial loans bankng states)
installment loans
Elycisiuni and Mebdiun labor, physical capital, securities held, real 191 banks with technical
(1990k demand deposits, estate loans corn meraal assets aver $300 inefficiency 10%
0E4 time and savings loans, allother loans million, 1980
intermediation deposits data
Ferrier andknell labor, occupancy number of demand 575 banks, 1984 overall
(19901 costs, expenditure deposit accounts, time data inefficiency 21%
DEL and stochastic cost on material and savings deposit (0IA), 26%
frontier accounts, real estate (stochastic cost
preclndtoit loans, installment loans, fronher)
commercial loans
Hunter andurania labor, physical commercial and security 317 bank with overall ineffioency’
(1995) capital, purchased loan consumer loans, assets over $1 bit- 30 54% (depend
dlstrthcittan free; funds, transactions all other loans, non lion, 1985-90 ing on model) 23
interniedinhon accounts, non-trans interest tncame data 36% (omllling 1%
actions accounts extreme values)
under $100,000
Koperakis nod others labor, physical capital, loansto individuals real 5,548 bankswith overall
(1994k interest bearing estate loom, commercial assets over $50 inefficiency. 10%
stochastic cast frontier; deposits under loans, other milhon 1986
intermediation $100 000 nato inter data
est bearing deposits,
purchasedfunds
time and savings deposits, notes and debenture and other borro ad funds,
federal funds pur hased, time deposits over S 100,000, foreign deposits and other harrowed fund
includes inefficiencies due to excessive deposit interest paid and purchased fund interet paid.
input treated as ‘quasi-fixed,’ thatis, not variablein the short run.
fed kinds sold securities bald, secunties andatlwr assets in froding account.
were to bedome effico nn in the lOE sense mmnomo e total co taoppo d to techntcab
mt mnput mmx\ ould ha\ c to be aLte cd the inefficoen whmch t a proportionate overuse
10k cor howev r can be ohtaoned b~ ofall input
onstden g the hypothetocal proportionate F’nali> we can detemmmn cale cffico ncy
redu noons of inputs rep e ented b~ h> comparong IWF computed under the
point C”. as umptoon that the fi m i operating at
In t rm ofFrgu 1 albocatove efficoenc con tant retu n to scale with IWF obtaoned
fo form C given by th ratio ofdistances pr ‘vlousby. Ac o ofunit> tmpboe that
OC”/OC’. Albocati~ e inefficiency arm e from the firm o operating under con t nt returns.
using a combmnatoon ofinput that doe not While a sco other than 1 doe not t an late
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A MATHEMATICAL DESCRIPTION OF EFFICIENCY
MEASUREMENT
We u e measure ofefficiency discussed where K Yx andy are defined as in
by Fare Gros kopf and Love!! (1985). equation 1 p is a (1 in) ector of input
First, we compute the inputweak technical pnces and i an (mX 1) vector ofeffi-
efficiency (IWE) score fo the ith finn ‘n a cient inputs to be computed The JOE
ample by olvmg the linear p ogramming co maybe defined as
p oblem~
inmnW (3) 0 px,Ip.x
subjectto Xq W , The con traints in equation 2 are
(1) Yq simila to those in 1 Th same eference
lq i technology i defined bythe constraints in
2 but in te d of proportionate!) reduc ng
C input until theithfinn hes on the efer-
wh enfirms prod cc outputs usngin n etechnology inputs are further reduced
inputs q isa (N 1) vector ofwei ht to proportiona ly until th rm hes on the
be computed for theith rm 0 V1~, 1 i ocost plane tangent to the production
as ala i a (in>< 1) v ctor of inputs for set boundary
he kth firm y,~a ( X 1) ecto of out- An allocative effici ncy s ore A, may
put fo he I th firm I ,x be d finedby du iding the IOE core by
i a (in N) matri of ob ervedinputs the IWE score:
Y—Ey ,.. y 1 isa(sXN) maui ofobserved
output andli a IXN) ctorofone (4) A 0,IW
The minimand W n equation 1 mea
sn s the input wea efficiency of he ith The ffic ency scores obtained from 1
firm. Th inequahty cons aints in equa mea u t chnical effi i ncy as thedi
ion I defin a r ferenc technologywith tance to the elevant isoquan hut do not
st ongdisposabil’i5 of input - con t a ning onsider whe e thefirm i ituated along
the weights o q to um no unity allows the the variable return p oduction frontier.
ref ence chnology to exhibitvariab! To measur scale efficiency equation 1
eturns to cale Fo the ith fi m W mu the recomputed for e cli firm fi
gives the proportion bywhi h inputs assuming constan eturn to scal by
can b educed to mov the firm f om removing he e tnction Cq I and then
the mterio of the production et onto assuming non increasing returns-to-- cale
the piecew se linearbounda of the byimpo ng the restri non Cq 1. In
produ tion set corre ponding to the the ase ofIWE his produce efficiency
eference technology in 1 scoresw andW respe t vely fo
N etw e compute nput overall effi the oh rm The scale efficiency sco e
ciency (bE) score 0 fo the fib firm by corre pondnmg to 1 i then defined as
fi st solving the linear program
(5) S w~1W
minp,x
uhjectto Xq — Clearly, 0 S I sinceW’~ W,”°~<
IfS,— 1 then the ith firm is scale-efficient.
Yq — y. that is th firm is ope ating at the point of
(2) lq, 1 constant returns on the production frontier.
q ~ IfS I then thefirm is cafe inefficient due
to etther decreasing return if W,NIn—W~,or
C inc ea ingreturnsifW, ~ W
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easily into a specific percentage deviation
from constant returns, the scores are useful
for ranking firms by the extent of their
inefficiency
Each of the efficiency scores described
above measures efficiencyin an input orien-
tation; efficiency is measured by holding
output fixed anti determining the maximum
feasible reduction in inputs. Efficiency can
also he measured by holdinginputs fixed
and determining the maximum feasible
expansion of outputs. Since the efficiency
measures we use do not imply underlying
assumptions regarding the behavior of firms,
the choice between input and output orien-
tations is somewhat arbitrary; one might
compute both types of efficiencymeasures
to get more information than can he obtained
from either the input or output orientations
alone. Note that both IWE and LOE are radial
measures of efficiency that is, in each case
efficiency is measured along a ray emanaung
from the origin and passing through the
firm in input-output space. Consequently,
the efficiency scores are independent ofthe
units ofmeasurement used for both inputs
and outputs, which is advantageous since
units ofmeasurement may always be defined
arbitrarily Fare and others (1985) observe




For our empirical analysis of conunercial
bank efficiency, we use a sample of banks
participating in the Federal Reserve System’s
Functional Cost Analysis (FCA) program for
1993, Participants in this program supply
information about their operations and costs
which are not generally available for banks,
and which are necessary to measure efficien-
cy using the production approach. After
eliminating observations with missing values
and observations fordepository institutions
other than commercial banks, data for 269
banks remain.
Because participation in the ECA pro-
gram is voluntary, the banks in our sample
may not be representative of the industry







age total assets at the end of 1993 for ECA
program banks was $163.6 million, with a
range from ff8.0 million no $2,602.8 million,
average total assets were S300.7 million,
with a range from 51.0 nuLhon to S108,223.0
million, for all U.S. commercial banks (as
reported in the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Reports ofCondition, than is, the
“Call Reports”). The average return on assets
of 1.15 percent for the banks in our sample,
however, was approximately the same as the
average for all banks (1.12 percent).
Nevertheless, because our sample of banks is
not random, the efficiency measures calculat-
ed here should not be interpreted as reflecting
the efficiency of commercial banks ito general.
For the production approach to modeling
hank activities, we construct variables using
definitions from Ferrier and 1_ovell (1990):
Outputs:
y~ = number of












= occupancy costs and expenditure on
furniture and equipment
= expenditure on materials






Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
y 790291 13091./6 46900 11336200
v. 761843 1068064 41300 10682i.00
y. 998.23 1503.99 000 1345600
y. 3134.01 691863 4400 8719400
y 899.63 174431 0.00 2399800
y 40/64316.60 60020/0009 1381963.00 65351900000
y 992727/589 141141890/9 510300000 1616691000.00
y ~203833i.6i 545123/638 0.00 3/7.249001) 00
y. 6254832.1/ ~3838012 74 1 278~0.00 6 m /136000.00
y 28553/75.52 64197191.1/ 0.00 8954/1000.00
x 88.02 14.109 3.89 1/30.07
.~. /76304.50 1760920.37 19000 13090834.00
x 330106.61 57691 2.53 1185900 6948552.00
w 30827.13 5905.65 1922238 6783263
w 0.0054 00025 00001 0.02/0
w 0.0023 0.0007 00010 0005/
p 30827.13 S9056 1922738 61832.63
~, 5206 48.43 0./5 /151/
,, 2188 11.69 236 131.86
1704520 37110.71 16600 43122/.00
/ 5441/53 96~1416 713.00 1279967.00
“: 16/5540 29282.60 9300 7/0~80.00
y 598003 12048.51 100.00 137300.00
u 11049098 158765.47 513800 1894)//90
, 18373.86 43312’ 2 20000 41024900
ii 89.32 150 08 400 856.00
u. 3008.39 5252.85 1300 4/51.00
p 0.0347 00048 0.0143 00489
p, 00392 0.0110 0.0066 01000
p 3111 618 20.38 /791
p. 0.34 031 0.08 2.83
Imm’,m.i I’’ ‘‘ )mi rim—
‘,...,, ml c..p~:,Immi’,’:. —.1mm’ .‘, l,mm~.m ‘‘Ii, — .‘:
ml, 1mm’.~
1.,,,.,, lm’’IJ .,m:m’
= x,/level of deposits personal expenses
= x1/level of deposits = real estate loans
v = commercial and industrial loans
For the intermediation approach to = federal funds sold, securities
bank production, we construct variables purchased under agreements
using definitions from Kaparakis, Miller to resell, plus total securities heidi
and Noulas (1994): in trading accounts




= interest-hearing deposits except




= purchased funds (certificates of
deposit greater than 5100,000.
federal funds purchased, and
securities sold plus demand nones)
and other borrowed money
it
3
= number of employees
014 = premises and fixed assets
Input prices:
= average interest cost per dollar of n~
P2 = average interest cost per dollar of it,
p3
= average annual wage per employee
p4
= average cost of premises and
fixed assets.
In addition. Kaparakis and others
also define quasi-fixed input, non-interest
bearing deposits, for which there is no corre-
sponding price. Other studies adopting the
intermediation approach have ignored this
item, as\ve do in the results reported below.
Including non-interest bearing deposits as
a fifth input when measuring technical or
scale efficiency seems to have little effect
on the results.
To form a specification midway between
the production approach represented by the
Ferrier and Love!! (1990) specificationand
the intermediation approach represented by
the Kaparakis and others (1994) specifica-
tion, we defineyi,,y as the dollar amount
of each account or loan corresponding to
y,,...,y>, respectively. Because outputs are
now measured in dollar amounts, this model
is best classified as representing the interme-
diation approach, even though the choice
of variables is based on Ferrier and Lovell
(1990). In addition, we define an alternative
price system, w~,w~, w~, for the Ferrierand
Lovell specification, where mtç = w,, and
w~ and w are computed similarly to w,
and w3 except that level of deposits is replaced
by the number of time and demand deposits.
This seems to us to make the mapping of
inputs and outputs under the production
approach more consistent. We report sum-




We compute the various efficiency mea-
sures for the five models summarized below:
Input







Models 1 and 2 correspond to the Ferrier
and Lovell (1990) specification, with alterna-
tive price definitions. Models 3 and 4 provide
a bridge to the intermediation approach by
replacing the number of accounts and loans
in the output variables with dollar amounts.
Model Sis the Kaparakis and others (1994)
specification.
Table 3 presents the mean scores for
each type of efficiency described in the
precedingsection. Nole that since the samne
inputs and outputs are used in models I
and 2, and models 3 and 4, the technical and
scale efficiencyscores are the same for these
models. For each efficiency measure, Table 3
also shows the standard deviation of thescores
across the 269 banks in the sample, the
number of banks having an efficiencyscore
ofunity (labeled “Number Efficient”), that
is, the number of banks operating on the
efficient frontier, as well as 90 and 95 percent
confidence intervals for the mean. Given
the large number ofbanks with efficiency
scores of unity, particularly in the case of
technical efficiency, and since all of the effi-
ciency scores are defined to lie between
zero and I, the underlying distributions of
the individlual efficiency scores are clearly
non-normal. Results from Atkinson and
Wilson (1995), however, suggest that our
sample size of 269 is easily large enough for
us to rely on the asymptotic normality of the
sample means implied by the central limit
theorem, and thus to compute confidence
intervals based on a normal distribution.
In several cases, the confidence intervals
for the means reported in Table 3 overlap.
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Efficiency Scores (269 observations)
Madel Mean Standard Number 90% Confidence 95% Canfidence
Error Efficient Interval Interval
Technical efficiency (Wk):
1.2 0.6348 0.0141 42 0.6115 0.6581 0.6071 0.6626
3.4 0.76/5 00103 52 0.7505 0.7846 0.74/2 0.78/9
5 0.8088 0010/ 75 0.7911 08265 0.787/ 0.8299
Scale efficiency (Sj:
1,2 0.8833 0006/ 37 0.8723 0.8943 0.8/0! 0.8964
3,4 0.9452 0.0047 49 0.93/4 09530 0.9359 0.9545
5 09414 0.0057 / 0.9319 0.9509 0.9301 0.952/
Allocative efficiency (Ak):
I 0.7698 0.0082 7 0.7562 0.7833 0.7536 07860
2 0.4992 0.0108 4 0.48)4 0.5170 0.4780 0.5204
3 0.1924 0.0068 1 0.7812 0.8036 0.7790 0.805/
4 0.6340 00108 7 0.6162 0.6518 06128 0.6552
5 0.7838 00080 13 0.7706 0.7970 0.7680 0./996
Overall efficiency (Ok):
1 04835 00116 7 0.4644 0.5026 04607 05063
2 0.3356 0.0128 4 0.3146 0.3567 0.3105 0.3607
3 0.6053 0.0095 7 0.5897 0.6209 0.5867 0.6239
4 0.4928 0.0121 7 0.4727 0.5128 0.4689 0.5166
5 0.6320 0.0107 13 0.6144 0.6196 0.6110 06529
We test for significant differences among
the means of each efficiency measure across
different models. At the 0.05 significance
level, we are unable to reject the null hypoth-
esis 0f equivalent means in the following
cases: (I) scale efficiency for models 3,4
and 5; (2) allocative efficiency for models 1
and 5, and models 3 and 5 (we do reject the
null hypothesis when comparing allocative
efficiency among models 1 and 3); and (3)
overall efficiency for models I and 4. In all
other instances, we reject the null hypothesis
ofno difference. Even the seemingly
innocuous modification of redefining the
inputprices between models 1 and 2, and
between 3 and 4 has a large effect on mean
allocative and overall efficiency Note also
that for the most extreme comparison,
models 1 (the production view) and 5
(the intermediation view), we reject the null
hypothesis ofequal levels of technical and
overall efficiency This suggests than, at least
for this sample of banks, average efficiency
does depend on the view ofbank production
assumed by the researcher. We find that
average technical and overall efficiency is
higher under the intermediation approach
(model 5) than under the production
approach (model 1). Our finding for overall
inefficiency of37 percent using models is
similar to what Aly and others (1990) found
for theirsample, though substantially greater
than what Kaparakis and others (1994)
found for theirs (see Table 1).
It is possible to deternmine whether a
particular bank lies on the increasing (IRS),
constant (CR5) or decreasing (DRS) returns
portion of the technology Table 4 shows
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the results of this analysis, considering only
banks that were found to he technically effi-
cient.t Thus, for example, 16 banks, or 38.1
percent of all technically efficient banks,
operated on the constant-returns portion of
the technology under models 1 and 2.
We test the null hypothesis of no associ-
ation among the rows and columns ofthe
matrix represented by Table 4 using Pearson’s
chi-square test, the likelihood ratio chi-square
statistic, and Fisher’s exact test.2 For the
entire matrix, all three nests reject the null
hypothesis of no differences in the propor-
tions in each row and column. 1!owever,
when we perform pairwise tests by deleting
individual rows from Table 4, we fail to
reject the null hypothesis of no difference
for models 3,4 and 5, and for models 1,2
and 3, 4. Each of the three tests fail to
reject at the 90 percent level.
In the case of models 1,2 and 5, we
reject the null hypothesis ofno difference
in the proportions at greater than 99 percent.
Thus, while we find evidence of similarity
in terms of returns-to-scale when comparing
models 3, 4 with either models 1, 2 or 5,
models 1, 2 and 5 appear different in terms
ofreturns-no-scale. Nore banks appear to be
operating under constant returns-to-scale
when the intermediation approach is taken
(mode! 5) than when the production approach
is used (model I). Since returns-to-scale
at a given location on the production frontier
depend upon the shape ofthe variable-
returns technology these results indicate
that the technology implicitly esnimaned
by models 3, 4 is simnilar to the technologies
implied by models 1. 2 and 5, which in turn
are significantly different. This is consistent
with our view ofmodels 3,4 as a bridge
between the production approach represent-
ed by models 1, 2 and the intermediation
approach represented by model 5. The
result also suggests that differences between
the two approaches might he due not only to
use of number ofaccounts and loans versus
dollar amounts, bun also to the treatment of
time depositsas an output or an input.
In addition to comparing mnean efficiency
scores, we use the Wilcoxon matched-pairs
signed-ranks test, a sign nest for equality of
medians and Kendall’s i-statistic to further
Returns to Scale



















examine the similarity of efficiency scores
across the five models. We report the results
of these tests in Table 53
The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-
ranks test analyzes the equality of distribu-
tions without making assumptions regarding
the form the distributions might take. The
values shown in parentheses in the second
column of Table 5 give the two-tailed normal
probabilities associated with the test statistic.
Hence, we fail to reject the null hypothesis
of identical distributions when comparing
scale efficiency scores from models 3, 4 and
5, when comparing allocative efficiency
scores from models 1 and 5. and from mod-
els 3 and 5, and when comnparing overall effi-
ciency scores from models I and 4. In all
other cases, we reject the null hypothesis.
It appears than, for the most part, the distrib-
utions of the various efficiencyscores do
vary across models.
The sign test for equivalence of medians
yields a two-tailed binomial probability which
wealso reportin Table 5. In only two instances
do we not reject the null hypothesis ofequal
medians: when comparing scale efficiency
scores from models 3, 4 and 5, and when
comparing allocative efficiency scores from
models 3 and 5. These results are consistent
with our finding that, in mostcases, average
efficiency varies across models.
Finally, rather than comparing the
distributions of efficiency scores from different
models, we use the scores to rank banks in
terms of their estimated efficiency Kendall’s
‘u-statistic measures the correlation among
the ranks of banks from two models and
provides a statistical test of the null hypothe-
sisof no association between two sets of
Since we one using on input
onientotion, we could ufso exowine
whethen inefficient books would
lie on the indleosing-, constant-
on decmeosing-netemns pottioe of
the technology ifinputs were pro-
poctionotefy contracted to wove
the honk to the frontier. Howeveç
since the polio honk wight octuolly
take to mend the fwntier ii the
sources of inefficiency wont
nemoved depends upon behoviumol
goois, we ignore technically ineffi-
cient honks here.
Details on these cowpototoos woy
be found in the Syoto Reference
Atona/: Releose 3.!, Stotn
Cooponoton (1993).
See Snedecom nod Cochoen (19891
and Kendolf ond Gibbous (1990)
for n discussion of these tests.
Connyototonol details one given
in the Stoto Reference 6/nenuof:
Release 3. I, Stotn Corporoton
(1993).







(probability values in parentheses)
Wilcoxon
Model Signed-Ranks Sign Test Kendall’s T
Technical efficiency (W):
(22 / 34) 8.24 0.0000 02513
(00001) (0.0000)
(12) 5 8.90 00000 00909
(0.0001) (00262)
f34)/S 325 00034 0108
(0.0012) (0.0’082)
Scale efficiency (Sk):
(121 (341 —946 00000 0.2333
(0.0001) (00000)
(12)/S —758 0.0000 01114
(00001) (00065)
(34)15 —032 0.4644 0.1805
(07482) (0.0000)
Allocative efficiency (Ak)a
(12) 12.88 0.0000 00068
(0.0001) (08680)
(13) 3.58 00003 04179
(0.0003) (0.0000)
(141 840 00000 -0.0964
(0.0001) (00185)
(1,5) —145 00327 00934
(01481) (00225)
(23) —1339 0.0000 00267
(00001) (05135)
(24) — 228 0.0000 05661
(00001) (0.0000)
(251 —13.03 0.0000 0.0342
(00001) (0A036)
(3,4) 1023 00000 00041
(0.0001) (09092)
(35) 032 06258 00627
(0.7515) (01255)






Model Signed-Ranks Sign Test Kendall’sr
Overall efficiency (Ok):
(12) 1231 00000 05874
(0.0001) (00000)
(1,3) —908 00000 0.2518
(0.0001) (00000)
(1,4) 106 00327 0.3072
(0.2903) (00000)
(15) —917 0.0000 0.1329
(0.0001) (0.0012)
(23) —1274 0.0000 0.1104
(00001) (0.0000)
(241 —11.62 00000 05000
(00001) (0.0000)
(25) —12.36 00000 0.0405
(00001) (0.3222)
(3,4) 9J6 0.0000 0.4128
(0.0001) (00000)
(35) 267 00015 0.1034
(0.0076) (0.0115)
(4,5) 901 00000 0.1831
(0.0001) (00000)
rankungs. The staustoc rs approxnnacel
normally di trobuted with zero e pected
value and with variance
VAR(r)= 4N+i0 -
9N(N—l)
where N gives the number of observations.
By definition, the statistic lies between -l
and +1, taking a value of +1 if rankings are
in complete agreement, or-i if the ranks are
completely reversed.
Kendall and Gibbons (1990) suggest
that the ‘u-statistic may also be viewed as a
measure of concordance. Any two pairs of
ranks (u1,v,) and (u3, vi). /,) = I N, i j, are
defined as concordant if v, <v1 when u~ <me1 or
v1>v1 when u>u1. Similarly they are defined
as discordant ifv~ <v, when u~> u~ or v > v,
when u1>u1. The total number ofpairs is
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N(N—1)/2, and ‘r canhe shown to be equiva-
lent to the proportion of concordant pairs
minus the proportion ofdiscordant pairs.
The last column of Table 5 gives the
i-statistic for the various pairs of models for
each measure of efficiency along with signifi-
cance levels as shown in parentheses. We
fail to reject the null hypothesis of no associ-
ation among ranks in only live instances
when comparing allocative efficiency scores.
(In particular, we fail to reject the null
hypothesis for the following pairs of models:
1, 2; 2,3; 2, 5; 3,4; and 3,5, and in only one
case when comparing overall efficiency
scores—for models 2 and 5). In all other
cases, we reject the null hypothesis
of no correlation.
None, however, that when we reject the
null hypothesis of no association, the
u-statistic is usually rather small in absolute
terms; the largest value of the statistic shown
in Table 5 is 0.5874 (in the case of overall
efficiency for onodels 1 and 2). As is typical
in classical hypothesis testing, rejection of
the null hypothesis does not necessarily
imply acceptance of an alternative hypothe-
sis. That is, our statistical test may reject the
hypothesis that therankings are not associated,
but that does non necessarily imply that the
rankings are associated—the test is simply not
that powerful. Figure 2 plots the rankings of
overall efficiency scores for model 1 against
those for model 5. None that the value of
Kendallis ‘u-statistic for this comparison is
significantly different from zero an the 0.0012
level, indicating that the two sets of rankings
are not discordant. The lo\v value of the test
statistic (0.1329), however, suggests that mlei-
ther are the)’ concordant.
Our results based on the Wilcoxon
matched-pairs signed-ranks test and the
sign test for equivalence ofmedians are
consistent with our observations on the
differences of mean efficiency scores across
the modeLs discussed earlier. Taken together,
our results indicate that different model
specifications are likely no produce different
measures ofthe level ofinefficiency among a
sample of banks, hut not necessarily dissimi-
lar rankings of individual banks in tenns
of measured efficiency For our data, the
rankings are similar enough to reject the
Rankings of Overall Efficiency Scores
Model I
300~ -~ /















null hypothesis ofno association, but in
many cases are far from being in complete
concordance. Concordance is relatively high
for the technical and scale efficiency mea-
sures, which do not rely on price data. The
introduction of price data to measure alloca-
nive and overall efficiency might also intro-
duce more sources ofnoise or error.
CONCLUSSON
l,ike other studies ofcommercial hank
efficiency, we find considerable inefficiency
among hanks in our sample. Other studies
have found suhscantial variation in efficiency
measures in applying different estimation
techniques no a common pool ofbanks. We
find that measured efficiency also depends on
the researcher’s conception ofwhat banks do.
In this article, we measure various types of
production efficiency under two very differ-
ent views ofbanking. We find that, on aver-
age, technical and overall efficiency is higher
under the intermediation view of the bank-
ing firm than under the production view.
Mean allocative efficiency is, however, similar
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under the extreme versions of each approach.
Under the intermediation view, we also find
somewhat less scale inefficiency and more
hanks operating on the constant-returns por-
tion of the efficient frontier. Despite the dif-
ferences in mean measured efficiency across
the different conceptions ofhow banks oper-
ate, however, we find some similarity in the
rankings of efficiency scores of individual
banks. Further research will, of course, be
necessary to determine how sensitive these
findings are to the particular dataset and esti-
mation techniques employed in this article.
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